Many people believe both that (i) there is an all knowing God, and that (ii) we humans can rightly be held responsible (praised, blamed, rewarded, punished) for at least some of the things that we do. But some contend that i and ii are incompatible — that if i is true then ii must be false (and vice versa).
Consider these six propositions (a-f) . . .
(a) There is an all knowing God.
(b) Someone knows and always has known everything there is to know.
(c) Long before I was born, someone already knew exactly how I would live my life.
(d) Long before I was born, it was already true that I'd live my life exactly as I'm living it.
(e) By the time I was born, it was too late for me to have any real say in how I'd live my life.
(f) I can't rightly be held responsible for anything that I do in this life.
The argument that Divine omniscience precludes human responsibility (that i and ii can’t both be true), proceeds by linking a to b, b to c, etc.. Thus . . .
1. If a then b.
2. If b then c.
3. If c then d.
4. If d then e.
5. If e then f.
6. If a then f.
To avoid the conclusion (6) (to hold that a doesn’t commit us to f — that i and ii can both be true), we need to deny at least one of the premises (1-5) — i.e., we need to deny at least one of the supposed intermediate links. So: Which if any of these links is questionable? Where (exactly) does the argument go wrong? Or does it? Anticipate objections.
Note: The question here is not which (if any) of a-f is false — it’s which (if any) of 1-5 is false (which if any of a-e doesn’t commit us to its successor).